We consider a common-pool renewable resource di¤erential game. We show that within this dynamic oligopolistic framework, free trade may lead to a lower discounted sum of consumer surplus and of social welfare than autarky. Trade restrictions may be supported based on both resource conservation and e¢ ciency motives. A priori, this …nding is not straightforward; a move from Autarky to Free Trade causes industry output to …rst increase and then decrease over time. While producers are shown to be always worse o¤ under free trade than under autarky, consumers are better o¤ in the short run and worse o¤ in the long run. We determine the conditions under which the long-run e¤ects outweigh the short-run e¤ects of trade, leading to a decrease in the discounted sum of not only consumer surplus, but also social welfare.
Introduction
A signi…cant and rising share of world trade consists of natural resources. 1 This includes trade in renewable resources such as …sh. For example, world exports of …sh increased by 60 per cent from 33 million tonnes to 53 million tonnes between 1990 and 2007, according to statistics from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In value terms, world …sh exports rose from $53 billion in 1998 to $98 billion in 2008. In Canada, for instance, …sheries products are the largest single food commodity export. 2 Trade in certain renewable resources is further facilitated by the structure of tari¤s they face in export markets with tari¤ rates rising with the stage of processing. Policy analysis regarding trade in renewable resources is complicated by the fact that their extraction often generates negative externalities. In the case of …sheries, open access in the absence of well de…ned property rights may lead to over-exploitation and eventual depletion of the resource stock if each …rm aims to maximize its individual pro…t without internalising the impact of its own extraction on rivals' extraction prospects. Thus, for common property resources, a dynamic analysis is warranted since current policies are inextricably linked with welfare of future generations. In this paper, we use a di¤erential game to examine whether policies that promote free trade in such resources improve the welfare of trading partners.
Our model setup consists of n countries with one …rm each. All …rms extract the renewable resource from a common pool. Each country also consumes the resource. Thus, under autarky, each country is served by a monopolist. Under free trade, the …rms compete in quantities in a single integrated market. Our setting re ‡ects the market structure in industries such as …sh where a few large …shing companies behave oligopolistically in the global market. 3 The …rms use closed loop strategies such that, at any instant in time, each …rm's 1 While the volume has remained fairly stable during the last decades, representing about 24 per cent of world merchandise trade in 2008 according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), in value terms trade in natural resources has grown annually at around 20 per cent. See the World Trade Report 2010 for further details: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr10-2a_e.pdf 2 See Fisheries and Oceans Canada for further details: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/stats/trade-commeng.htm 3 We note that a number of papers have studied trade of renewable resources in a perfectly competitive extraction is a function of the resource stock, which in turn depends on the extraction of all …rms. The advantage of using closed loop strategies is that they yield subgame perfect Nash equilibria, while open loop strategies, where extraction is a function of time but not the stock, typically do not. 4 We note that a number of papers in the previous literature have used a di¤erential game framework with closed loop strategies to analyze common property resources, although they analyze a closed economy context rather than allowing for trade across countries. For example, Benchekroun (2003) examines the impact of unilateral production restrictions, while Benchekroun (2008) examines the e¤ect of changes in the natural growth rate of the stock and of the number of …rms. These papers, together with Mantovani (2014, 2016) characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a common property duopoly, highlighting di¤erent features. They show that extraction strategies and value functions take a piecewise-linear form, which depends on the resource stock level. There can be a unique or multiple long-run stationary equilibria, depending on the parameters of the model. Also, nonlinear feedback solutions may be unstable. Fujiwara (2008) builds on Benchekroun (2003) to
show that linear feedback strategies lead to a smaller output than monopoly, static duopoly and non-linear feedback strategies. Taking into account such strategic behaviour and possible non-linearities of the growth of the resource stock, Labrecciosa (2013a, 2013b) examine the role of property rights and convergence to the Cournot equilibrium, while others characterize the optimal taxation policy (see, for example, Kossioris et al., 2011) . Within a similar setting, while Fujiwara (2011) examines losses from competition, Benchekroun and Gaudet (2015) study the impact of mergers. Benchekroun and Long (2016) introduce a concept of …rms' social status which depends either on extraction levels or pro…t levels, while Grilli and Bisceglia (2017) consider a …nite planning horizon. Vardar and Zaccour (2018) extend Benchekroun (2008) by introducing pollution externalities that are generated market using the logistic function to represent biological growth of the resource in a constrained environment (see, for example, Munro, 1979; Taylor, 1997, 1998; Hannesson, 2000; Jinji, 2006 Jinji, , 2007 .
as a by-product of extraction. We contribute to this literature by comparing the equilibria under autarky and free trade within a setting similar to that used in the above papers. 5
Our work is more closely related to Fujiwara and Shinozaki (2010) which examines the e¤ect of trade liberalization in a common property duopoly. They …nd that although the e¤ect of reductions in trade costs on welfare is non-monotonic, welfare under autarky is unambiguously higher than that under free trade, a result that is in contrast to that derived in static models and driven by the feedback strategies used by …rms. Our model setting di¤ers from Fujiwara and Shinozaki (2010) in the following ways. We assume that under free trade, there exists a single integrated market rather than markets that are segmented across countries. We include n > 2 …rms in our oligopoly. Moreover, while Fujiwara and Shinozaki (2010) focus solely on the steady state welfare level, we also analyze the e¤ect of moving from autarky to free trade on the transition to the steady state.
Our …rst contribution is to show that, within our context, the steady state stock level is unambiguously lower under free trade than under autarky, implying that the externalities due to open access are exacerbated by allowing for trade. This is in line with empirical observations. While world exports of …sh increased by 60 per cent between 1990 and 2007, world …sheries production rose by 42 per cent from 98 million tonnes to 140 million tonnes, according to FAO. However, annual catches from oceans and fresh water …sheries were constant during this period, at around 90 million tonnes, with most of the growth in production and trade accounted for by aquaculture. These statistics have raised concerns that the world's oceans and fresh water …sheries may have reached peak production and could be over-exploitated in the face of growing demand, as summarised by the World Trade Report 2010. This may also explain why renewable resources are twice as likely to face export taxes as other sectors, as noted in the WTO's Trade Policy Reviews. 6 5 A few papers also study di¤erent aspects of trade in renewable resources that we abstract away from in this paper. For example, one stream of the literature endogenizes the role of institutions (see Bulte and Barbier, 2005 , for a survey). Quaas and Stöven (2014) apply new trade theory with consumers' love for variety to the case of renewable resources. 6 Around 11 per cent of world trade in natural resources is covered by export taxes, while just 5 per cent of world trade is covered by export taxes. Moreover, 15 to 25 per cent of world trade in …sh is estimated to The impact of trade on consumer surplus of an individual country is a priori ambiguous.
On the one hand, the smaller resource stock in the long run leads to lower consumption (and consumer surplus) in the long run. At the same time, higher extraction in the short run leads to higher consumption (and consumer surplus) in the short run. A natural question that arises, and which has not been addressed in the previous literature, is whether consumers are better o¤ due to freer trade once we aggregate their gains and losses over time. By capturing the transition dynamics, we are able to show that aggregate consumer surplus over time decreases due to freer trade as long as the stock does not exceed a certain threshold, in sharp contrast to most static trade models. 7 Producer surplus always decreases with a move from Autarky to Free Trade. Together, the results on consumer and producer surplus imply that there exists a threshold in terms of the stock level below which aggregate social welfare over time is lower under Free Trade than under Autarky.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark case of autarky.
Section 3 presents the free trade scenario. Section 4 compares autarky and free trade. All variables representing the Autarky scenario are denoted by the superscript "A", while all variables respresenting the Free Trade scenario are denoted by the superscript "F T ". Section 5 presents our concluding remarks.
The Benchmark Model: Autarky
We consider a renewable resource that is harvested by n countries. There exists one …rm in each country, which is a monopoly in the supply of the renewable resource in its domestic market in the absence of trade. We assume that the countries are exploiting a common pool for consumption in the domestic markets. The stock of the renewable resource is denoted be covered by export taxes, relative to 5 to 10 per cent of world trade in fuels and mining.
7 Another paper to focus on aggregate consumer surplus over time for a common pool renewable resource sector, using a closed-loop di¤erential game model, is Colombo and Labrecciosa (2018) . They examine the impact of increased cooperation between …rms, rather than that of freer trade. They show that increased cooperation makes consumers worse o¤ in the short run and better o¤ in the long run such that the discounted sum of consumer surplus increases in cooperation for initial stock levels below a threshold. by S. The natural reproduction function of the stock is given by F (S) with
and
where > 0 represents the intrinsic growth rate of the resource. When the stock exceeds a threshold stock S y the rate of growth of the resource diminishes with the stock. Thus S y represents the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). S represents the carrying capacity of the habitat. That is, for a stock level beyond S > S y growth is limited by the habitat and is negative. For simplicity, we normalize S to 1.
Each …rm simultaneously extracts the available resource to maximize the present value of its discounted payo¤ over an in…nite horizon. Let the extraction rate of each …rm i 2 (1; 2; ::::; n) at time t be denoted by q i (t). Each …rm faces a linear inverse demand function given by P A i = a bq A i with i = 1; 2; ::::n; and zero marginal cost of extraction. Therefore, …rm i 0 s instantaneous payo¤ at time t is given by:
For each …rm, and thereby each country, the instantaneous payo¤ is maximized when q A = a 2b . Assuming that the stock can be observed by each …rm and used for conditioning behavior, we focus on the set of stationary Markovian strategies, as given by:
Thus, at any point in time, the extraction decision of a country depends only on the level of the stock at that moment.
Firm i takes the other …rms' strategies as given and chooses a stationary Markovian strategy that maximizes the following:
where r > 0 is the common discount rate.
Assumption 1: We assume that > 0 ; where 0 r(1 + n 2 ) 2 :
Assumption 1 ensures that the rate of growth of the stock is su¢ ciently large relative to the rate of discount, r; such that an interior positive stable steady state stock exists under free trade (see Benchekroun, 2008) .
Assumption 2: We assume that
Assumption 2 ensures that it is possible to sustain a consumption rate that maximizes each agent's instantaneous utility. It also ensures that a positive steady state exists under Autarky.
Given the autonomous nature of each …rm's problem, we focus on stationary Markovian strategies and use a dynamic programming approach to characterize the feedback equilibrium of this di¤erential game (see Dockner et al., 2000, Ch 4.) . Let ( A 1 ; ::; A n ) be a subgame
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with …rm i's problem is given by:
Proposition 1 Let
The vector ( A ; ::; A ) constitutes a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) of the Autarky game.
Proof: See Appendix.
The extraction strategy under Autarky, as presented by (4) ; is depicted in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Extraction strategy under Autarky
Remark 1: Under the MPNE of the Autarky game, there are two positive steady state resource stocks that are given by:
with S A 1;1 semi-stable with basin of attraction (0; S A 2 ]; and S A 2;1 locally asymptotically stable with basin of attraction S A 2 ; 1 . Note that for S 2 S A 2 ; 1 the outcome of the MPNE ( A ; ::; A ) corresponds to the outcome of a repeated static game where the resource is abundant. To sum up, the MPNE results in the following steady states under Autarky:
This section extends the benchmark model, as presented in the previous section, to allow for free trade among the n countries. We assume that the …rms behave as oligopolists, and supply their harvest to an integrated market which consists of all the n countries'domestic markets. Let q F T i (t) denote the quantity harvested and supplied by …rm i at time t. The inverse market demand function P F T (q) is given by P F T = a b n q; where q = n j=1 q F T j :
The instantaneous payo¤ function of …rm i is given by:
Assumptions 1 and 2 continue to hold.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated with the problem of …rm i is given by:
where w F T a (2 (n 2 + 1) r) 2b n(n + 1)
; z F T (n + 1)(2 r) 2n 2 ;
and S F T 1 an (2 r (1 + n 2 )) b (n + 1) 2 (2 r) and S F T 2 an (n 2 + 1) b (n + 1) 2 :
The vector ( F T ; ::; F T ) constitutes a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) of the Free Trade game.
The extraction strategy under Free Trade, as presented by (8) ; is depicted in Figure 2 . an ( 2 + n 2 r + r) b (n + 1)(2 (n + 1)r) ;
(10)
and S F T 3;1 an 2 (S y 1) b (n + 1)S y + 1:
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that S F T 1;1 is locally asymptotically stable with basin of attraction 0; S F T 2;1 whereas S F T 2;1 is unstable and S F T 3;1 is locally asymptotically stable with basin of attraction S F T 2;1 ; 1 . Note that for S 2 S F T 2;1 ; 1 ; the outcome of the MPNE ( F T ; ::; F T ) corresponds to the outcome of a repeated static game where the resource is abundant.
Autarky vesus Free Trade
This section provides a comparison of the scenarios with and without trade. We begin by comparing the harvesting strategies under Autarky and Free Trade, as given by (4) and (8) respectively.
Proposition 3 In the short-run, a move from Autarky to Free Trade results in an increase in extraction for all resource stock levels above S F T 1 :
Proof: It follows from (5) and (9) (2) and (9) ; it follows that:
< 1 for all n 2: 9 (14) 8 We have
2n(2 r(1+n 2 )) ; with (n + 1) 2 ( nr) 2n 2 r 1 + n 2 = ( + nr) (n 1) 2 > 0 9 We have S A 2 S F T 2 = 1 2 (n+1) 2 n 2 +1 < 1 for all n 2:
Moreover, comparing the slopes of the extraction strategies, we have that z A z F T < 1 for all n 2: 10 (15) Together, (13) ; (14) and (15) imply the following:
Proposition 3 implies that the extraction level increases in the short run due to a move from Autarky to Free Trade, which has further implications for the long run, as discussed below.
Steady State Resource Stock under Autarky and Free Trade
Let and when S y < an 2 b(1+n) ; respectively. 10 We have z A z F T = 2n 2 2n 2 +n 1 < 1 for all n 2. It can be shown that the following holds:
Moreover, for S y > an 2 b(1+n) , it can be shown that the following holds:
When S y > an 2 b(1+n) ; we split the state space into three regions: Region 1 corresponds to S 2 (0; S A 2 ], Region 2 corresponds to S 2 (S A 2 ; S F T 3;1 ) and Region 3 corresponds to S 2 [S F T 3;1 ; 1): Region A, and in the long-run the stock converges to the smallest positive steady state level, S F T 1;1 . Therefore, while in the short-run free trade results in an increase in consumption, the impact of free trade is to decrease consumption at the steady state. The impact of free trade on the discounted sum of consumer surplus is thus a priori undetermined. We examine this impact in the following section.
Aggregate consumer surplus under Autarky and Free Trade
From the analysis above, we can unambiguously state that when S y > an 2 b(1+n) for S in Region 3, i.e., S > S F T 3;1 the impact of free trade on consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare is the same as in a repeated static game with no resource constraint. In this simple static game, it is straightforward to establish that the consumer (producer, welfare) surplus under free trade is larger (smaller, larger) than under autarky. Much less obvious is the impact of free trade on the aggregate consumer surplus and aggregate producer surplus in the case where the resource constraint is binding, i.e., S < S F T 3;1 .
While in the short-run consumer surplus under free trade is larger than under autarky, the opposite holds in the long-run. Aggregate consumer surplus of country i consists of the discounted sum of instantaneous consumer surplus over the in…nite horizon, and is given by:
Let CS A i denote the aggregate consumer surplus of country i under Autarky and CS F T i denote the aggregate consumer surplus of country i under Free Trade.
This can be computed for Autarky and for Free Trade using the respective extraction strategies. Alternatively, it can be shown that, when all …rms adopt an extraction strategy q (S), the feedback form of CS satis…es the following di¤erential equation:
When q (S) is a¢ ne with q (S) = w + zS the function CS (S) is given by CS (S) = AS 2 +
2bwz + bnwz 2 + brwz 3r + 2 2 + 2n 2 z 2 + r 2 4nz + 3nrz G 2bw 2 2 + br 2 w 2 3brw 2 + bnrw 2 z 4r 2 6r 2 + 2r 3 + 6nr 2 z + 4n 2 rz 2 8nrz :
We can thus compute consumers surplus under autarky and under free trade for S 2 S A 1 ; S A 2 by substituting (w; z) respectively by w A ; z A and by w F T ; z F T :
When n = 2 we can show analytically that for S 2 S A 1 ; S A 2 we have CS A (S) > CS F T (S): while free trade always results in an increase (a decrease) in instantaneous consumer surplus in the short-run (long-run), the overall impact of free trade on consumer surplus when the transition dynamics is taken into account is to decrease aggregate consumer surplus. Numerical simulations for n > 2 yield the same conclusion.
To prove our claim we write, for n = 2,
with h ( ; r) b 15r 4 2 + 15r 3 3 60r 2 4 60r 5 576r 2 r 2 + 3r + 2 2 k ( ; r) a 576r 2 r 2 + 3r + 2 2 12r 4 + 156r 3 2 480r 2 3 + 240r 4 l ( ; r) a 2 576r 2 b r 2 + 3r + 2 2 4r 4 188r 3 + 312r 2 2 280r 3 + 80 4 Note that h ( ; r) = rh r ; 1 k ( ; r) = k r ; 1 l ( ; r) = 1 r l r ; 1
and therefore the sign of h; k; l depends on the ratio r only, and that we can normalize r to 1 for the rest of proof without loss of generality. This yields h ( ; 1) = 5b 192 (2 1) k ( ; 1) = a 48 (2 1) 15 + 10 2 1 ( + 1) (2 + 1) l ( ; 1) = a 2 144b 47 + 78 2 70 3 + 20 4 + 1 2 ( + 1) (2 + 1)
From Assumption 1 we have > 5 2 (recall that n = 2) and therefore h ( ; 1) > 0. The sign of k ( ; 1) is given by the sign of the following expression: = 1: 563 9. Therefore, for all > 5 2 > 1: 563 9 we have k ( ; 1) > 0.
To establish that l ( ; 1) > 0 for > 5 2 ; we note that l ( ; 1) has the same sign as ( ) 47 + 78 2 70 3 + 20 4 + 1. Since 00 ( ) = 12 35 + 20 2 + 13 > 0 for > 5 2 ;
we have 0 ( ) > 0 5 2 = 561 2 > 0 for all > 5 2 and, therefore, ( ) > 5 2 = 117 2 > 0 for > 5 2 . This completes the proof that l ( ; 1) > 0 and, therefore, h ( ; r) ; k ( ; r) ; l ( ; r) > 0,
We have, thus, proven that in Region 1, CS A (S) > CS F T (S) and, therefore, Free Trade results in a smaller aggregate consumer surplus than Autarky. This result, combined with the observation that in Region 3 we have CS A (S) < CS F T (S) ; and using continuity of CS (S) ; allows us to conclude that there exists a threshold stockS in Region 2 such that
Aggregate producer surplus under Autarky and Free Trade
Next, we compare the producer surplus of each …rm under Autarky and Free trade. Since we have a symmetric equilibrium with a single …rm in each country, the results pertaining to a single …rm are also applicable to the country's aggregate producer surplus. This consists of the discounted sum of instantaneous producer surplus over the in…nite horizon, as given by the value functions, (18) and (21) ; in the Appendix.
We note that, in Region 1, at the steady state, we have V A S A 1;1 > V F T S F T 1;1 = (2 r+nr) 2 (n 1) 2 a 2 4(r 2 +nr) 2 (n+1) 2 br > 0: Moreover, for n = 2 we can show analytically that for any S 2 S A 1 ; S A 2 we have V A (S) > V F T (S) : Thus, free trade results in a decrease in instantaneous producer surplus in the short-run and in the long-run, such that the impact of free trade on producer surplus when the transition dynamics is taken into account is to decrease aggregate producer surplus. Numerical simulations for n > 2 yield the same conclusion.
For n = 2 and S 2 S A 1 ; S A 2 ;
where u ( ; r) 1 288br 2 30b 2 r 3 15b 2 r 2 2 v ( ; r) 1 288br 2 12abr 2 24abr 2
x ( ; r) 1 288br 2 4a 2 r 2 8a 2 r 8a 2 2 Note that u ( ; r) = ru r ; 1 v ( ; r) = v r ; 1
x ( ; r) = 1 r l r ; 1
and therefore the sign of u; v; and x depends on the ratio r only, and that we can normalize r to 1 for the rest of proof without loss of generality. This yields the following:
As noted earlier, from Assumption 1 we have > 5 2 for n = 2 and, therefore, u ( ; 1) < 0; v ( ; 1) > 0 and x ( ; 1) > 0. Thus, V A (S) V F T (S) is a strictly concave function with a positive intercept at S = 0: It is, therefore, straightforward to show that V A (S) V F T (S) > 0 for Region 1. We have thus proven that in Region 1, V A (S) > V F T (S) and therefore Free
Trade results in a smaller aggregate producer surplus than Autarky. This result combined with the observation that in Region 3 we also have V A (S) > V F T (S) allows us to conclude that Free Trade decreases producer surplus regardless of the initial stock level. 
Conclusion
We examine the impact of opening up an economy to allow free trade in a common pool renewable resource such as …sh, using a di¤erential game framework. Our model consists of n countries with one …rm each. Each country also consumes the resource. Under free trade, the …rms compete in quantities in a single integrated market using closed loop strategies.
Most static trade models predict an increase in world output due to freer trade, which is associated with higher consumer surplus. By incorporating the open access externalities associated with common pool resources within a dynamic framework, we show that the increase in output due to freer trade is temporary and ultimately leads to a lower steady state stock level than under autarky. This is in line with empirical observations which show that yields from oceans and fresh water …sheries have remained constant in recent years, with increasing trade in …sh being accounted for by growing production from …sh farms, raising concerns that peak production may have been reached in this industry. Moreover, we show that the increase in consumer surplus associated with the trade-induced increase in output is also temporary, and is reversed in transition to the lower post-trade steady state stock We note that in the presence of wide asymmetries across countries, trade in renewable resources may indeed be bene…cial to consumers in some countries. Our results are, therefore, most relevant to cases where countries have similar access to the common pool resource. This scenario may apply to the global …sh industry where countries indirectly share similar access to the oceans and fresh water …sheries through a few large …shing companies which behave strategically in the world market. In a broader context, our results may also apply to global environmental problems caused by accumulative pollutants such as greenhouse gases or plastic waste accumulation. In these contexts, the global environmental quality may be interpreted to be the renewable resource with its stock declining in the stock of the pollutant, which has some natural rate of decay and increases in emission levels.
rV A (S) = a 2 + V A0 (S)(4b S 2an) + (2n 1)V A02 4b (17) Applying the "undetermined coe¢ cient technique" (see, e.g. Benchekroun, 2008 , for further details), from (17) ; we obtain the following value function:
V A (S) = 4br :
Di¤erentiating (18) with respect to S; and substituting into (16) yields Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 2:
The …rst order condition associated with (7) is given by:
Assuming symmetry, we have the following:
For a symmetric equilibrium, we have the following: 
where W F T (S) F T S 2 2 + F T S + F T with F T b(n + 1) 2 (2 r) 2n 3 F T a F T n (n 2 + 1) b(n + 1) 2 ( r) + 2 F T n 3 F T n a 2 a F T (n 2 + 1) + F T 2 n 2 b(n + 1) 2 r Di¤erentiating (21) with respect to S; and substituting into (19) yields Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
From (6) and (10) ; we have the following: S F T 1;1 S A 1;1 = 2 (2 r (1 + n 2 )) (n + 1) (2 r (1 + n)))
Since (2 r (1 + n 2 )) (2 r (1 + n))) < 1;
and 2 (n + 1) < 1 for n > 2;
it follows that S F T 1;1 S A 1;1 < 1:
From (6) and (12) ; we have the following: 
